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EPISTEMIC INSOUCIANCE 
Quassim Cassam 
Abstract: One way to make sense of recent political events is to reflect on the role of epistemic 
insouciance in political debate. Epistemic insouciance is a casual lack of concern or 
carelessness about the facts, an indifference to whether one’s assertions have any basis in 
reality. It implies an excessively nonchalant attitude towards the challenge of finding answers 
to complex questions, partly as a result of a tendency to view such questions as less complex 
than they really are. The primary product of epistemic insouciance is bullshit in Harry 
Frankfurt’s sense. Epistemic insouciance is an epistemic posture rather than a stance. It is an 
epistemic vice, both in the sense that it gets in the way of knowledge and is blameworthy or 
otherwise reprehensible. Epistemic insouciance is different from epistemic malevolence. The 
latter is a stance rather than a posture. Epistemic insouciance is illustrated by the conduct of 
some parties to the Brexit debate in the UK. A compelling example of epistemic malevolence 
is the ‘tobacco strategy’.   
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In the days leading up to Britain’s 2016 vote to leave the European Union (EU), a leading pro-
Leave campaigner was asked by a journalist how many independent economic authorities 
agreed with him that Britain would be better off outside Europe. The interviewer was Faisal 
Islam of Sky News and his interviewee was Michael Gove, a government minister. Gove was 
pressed by Islam to admit that his views about the economic benefits of leaving the European 
Union were not shared by most experts. In response Gove airily dismissed such concerns. ‘The 
people of this country’, he insisted ‘have had enough of experts’.1 
Gove wasn’t the only Leave campaigner who seemed to be thinking in these terms. In 
an interview after the vote Arron Banks, a funder of the Leave campaign, explained his side’s 
victory on basis that the pro-EU Remain campaign had featured ‘fact, fact, fact, fact, fact’ but 
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that didn’t work: ‘you’ve got to connect with people emotionally’.2 Facts, on this view, are 
boring, and politicians who rely on evidence or experts in formulating their policies are likely 
to fail when confronted by opponents who don’t feel the need to burden themselves with such 
matters. Many commentators detected in the posture of Gove and Banks evidence of the rise 
of ‘post-truth politics’ in the UK, a style of politics in which, in the words of the Guardian 
columnist Jonathan Freedland, ‘an unhesitating liar can be king’ and ‘those pedants still hung 
up on the facts and evidence and all that boring stuff are left for dust, their boots barely laced 
while the lie has spread halfway around the world’ (Freedland 2016).  
The post-truth politicians targeted by Freedland included Boris Johnson, a former 
Mayor of London and leading figure in the Leave campaign. In an early career as a journalist 
for the Telegraph he made his name by writing faintly comic but mendacious articles about the 
EU. Johnson revelled in the effect his articles seemed to be having and laughed it off when his 
stories were shown to bear no relation to reality. He was twice fired for lying and was described 
by fellow politician-turned-journalist Mathew Parris as ‘under-prepared, jolly, sly, dishonest 
and unapologetic’ (Parris 2016). Curiously, Johnson had a reputation for not being in favour 
of withdrawal from the EU. Although he wrote a pro-Leave article for the Daily Telegraph it 
later transpired that he had also written a second article arguing for the opposite point of view.3        
 It’s hardly news that politicians can be cynical and dishonest but what was striking 
about the politicians profiled by Freedland was their sheer insouciance. Insouciance in the 
ordinary sense is a casual lack of concern, carelessness or indifference. The particular form of 
insouciance to which some politicians are prone is epistemic insouciance: a casual lack of 
concern about the facts or an indifference to whether their political statements have any basis 
in reality. Epistemic insouciance means not really caring much about any of this and being 
excessively casual and nonchalant about the challenge of finding answers to complex 
questions, partly as a result of a tendency to view such questions less complex than they really 
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are. Epistemic insouciance means not giving a shit. It means viewing the need to find evidence 
in support of one’s views as a mere inconvenience, as something that is not to be taken too 
seriously. Finding accurate answers to complex questions can be hard work and epistemic 
insouciance makes that hard work seem unnecessary.  
Before going any further, there is one concern about the idea of epistemic insouciance 
that needs to be addressed at the outset. This is the concern that it is no more than an exotic 
label for a familiar phenomenon: intellectual dishonesty. When a politician makes claims that 
he knows to be false he isn’t being ‘epistemically insouciant’. He is lying. On this reading, 
calling a politician ‘epistemically insouciant’ is a polite way of saying, or implying, that he is 
a barefaced liar. In that case, why not just call him a barefaced liar? This is a reasonable 
question, and the best way to answer it is to relate the notion of epistemic insouciance to Harry 
Frankfurt’s notion of bullshit. In his essay ‘On Bullshit’ Frankfurt gives this account of the 
difference between lying and bullshitting: 
It is impossible for someone to lie unless he thinks he knows the truth…. A person who 
lies is thereby responding to the truth and he is to that extent respectful of it. When an 
honest man speaks, he says only what he believes to be true; and for the liar, it is 
correspondingly indispensable that he considers his statements to be false. For the 
bullshitter, however, all these bets are off: he is neither on the side of the true nor on 
the side of the false. His eye is not on the facts at all, as the eyes of the honest man and 
of the liar are, except insofar as they may be pertinent to his interest in getting away 
with what he says. He does not care whether the things he says describe reality correctly 
(2005: 55-6). 
It is because the bullshitter doesn’t care about this that ‘bullshit is a greater enemy of the truth 
than lies are’ (2005: 61). The bullshitter doesn’t reject the authority of truth, he pays no 
attention to it at all.4 
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One way to put this would be to describe the bullshitter as epistemically insouciant. 
Indeed, bullshit is the primary product of epistemic insouciance. Bullshit is ‘produced without 
concern for the truth’ (Frankfurt 2005: 47), and this lack of concern is the essence of epistemic 
insouciance. This explains why being epistemically insouciant is not the same as being a liar. 
Lying is something that a person does rather than an attitude, and the intention to conceal the 
truth implies that the liar is not indifferent to the truth or falsity of his utterances. Epistemic 
insouciance is an attitude rather than something that a person does, and it does imply an 
indifference to the truth or falsity of his utterances. To describe a politician as a liar rather than 
as epistemically insouciant is to ignore the fundamental distinction between their lies and their 
bullshit. Of course bullshitters can be liars but it isn’t their lying as such that makes them 
bullshitters, and they don’t have to be liars in order to qualify as epistemically insouciant. The 
politicians I’ve accused of epistemic insouciance may or may not be liars but their political 
success is a testament to what James Ball aptly describes as the ‘power of bullshit’ (2017: 15).    
Epistemic insouciance is an epistemic vice. As I conceive of them, epistemic vices are 
character traits, attitudes or thinking styles that systematically, though not invariably, ‘get in 
the way of knowledge’ (Medina 2013: 30) by obstructing the gaining, keeping or sharing of 
knowledge. I call this account of epistemic vice obstructivism. As obstructivism conceives of 
them, epistemic vices are harmful to us as knowers but they are different from mere defects. 
Unlike mere defects, epistemic vices are blameworthy or otherwise reprehensible. Epistemic 
insouciance is an attitude vice, an epistemic vice that is an attitude. By ‘attitude’ I don’t mean 
‘propositional attitude’. Epistemic insouciance is what I will call an epistemic posture.5 Some 
attitude vices are epistemic postures while others are epistemic stances. I’ll have more to say 
below about distinction between postures and stances but a good example of an epistemically 
vicious stance is what Jason Baehr calls ‘epistemic malevolence’.6 Epistemic insouciance and 
epistemic malevolence can be difficult to distinguish in practice and some of the political 
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conduct I have been describing might be viewed as epistemically malevolent rather than 
insouciant. I will come back to this, after discussing a more clear-cut example of epistemic 
malevolence, namely, the so-called ‘tobacco strategy’ described by Naomi Oreskes and Erik 
Conway in their book Merchants of Doubt.7 
This paper has three main missions. The first is to elucidate the notion of an epistemic 
posture and make it plausible that epistemic insouciance is one such posture. The second is to 
elucidate the notion of an epistemic stance, with a view to distinguishing between stances and 
postures and identifying epistemic malevolence as a stance rather than a posture. The third is 
to explain the sense in which epistemic insouciance and epistemic malevolence are bona fide 
epistemic vices. Having completed these missions I will end with some brief reflections on the 
relationship between attitude vices and other vices. This essay is a contribution to vice 
epistemology, the philosophical study of the nature, identity and epistemological significance 
of epistemic vices.8 Vice epistemology is less familiar than virtue epistemology, but the study 
of epistemic virtue is unlikely to cast much light on recent political events.  
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  Epistemic insouciance is an attitude but what is an attitude? One’s attitude towards 
something is one’s perspective on it.9 Attitudes require attitude objects, and an attitude object 
is anything towards which it is possible to have an attitude.10 So, for example, people, political 
parties and ideas are attitude objects. Attitudes can be positive or negative, weaker or stronger. 
Examples include dislike, contempt, indifference, disdain, suspicion, nonchalance, hostility, 
cynicism and respect. These are all examples of postures. For example, contempt for another 
person is a posture towards them that has a range of behavioral manifestations such as refusing 
to shake their hand or avoiding them in social situations. As Michelle Mason notes, contempt 
is a ‘form of regard’ that has a ‘salient affective quality’ (2003: 241). One element of contempt 
is a low regard for the object of one’s contempt but contempt isn’t just a matter of belief or 
6 
 
opinion.11 It is something that is felt, and this feeling of contempt is the affective quality of the 
attitude. If this is right then contempt for another person is not just a posture but an affective 
posture. 
Another affective posture is arrogance. At the heart of arrogance is a ‘dismissive 
attitude towards the views and perspectives of others’ (Tiberius & Walker 1998: 382). In the 
case of intellectual arrogance this attitude is grounded a belief in one’s intellectual superiority 
but arrogance, like contempt, isn’t just a matter of belief. It also involves what Alessandra 
Tanesini describes as ‘a feeling of superiority over others’ (2016: 74).12 The affective quality 
of arrogance, like that of contempt, is a mental presence – a feeling of superiority- but not all 
postures are like arrogance and contempt in this regard. For example, one might be said to feel 
indifferent about something but indifference is marked by the absence of certain feelings or 
emotions rather than by their presence. However, not even indifference is a pure absence; there 
is something that it feels like not to care about something or to be left feeling cold about it. 
Like numbness, indifference is both a feeling and an absence of feeling. 
Affective postures are typically involuntary. The sense in which this is so is that they 
aren’t matters of choice or decision. This isn’t surprising since how one feels isn’t usually a 
matter of choice or decision. For example, if one feels contempt or respect for another person 
one hasn’t usually chosen to be contemptuous or respectful. One can, of course, choose to show 
respect but one can’t choose to have respect for someone if one can see nothing about them 
that deserves respect. Equally, one can’t decide to feel intellectually superior.13 Even if, for 
some obscure reason, one decides to be dismissive of the views and perspectives of another 
person one might find their views so compelling that it is impossible for one not to take them 
seriously.  
In philosophy, ‘attitudes’ are usually understood as ‘propositional attitudes’, that is, as 
mental states ascribed by means of a ‘that’ clause. Postures are not propositional attitudes, 
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though they involve propositional attitudes. The relationship between propositional attitudes 
and postures is complicated. On the one hand, it seems clear that many postures aren’t 
propositional attitudes and many propositional attitudes aren’t postures. One is contemptuous 
or disdainful towards something or someone. There is no such thing as having contempt or 
disdain that such-and-such.  Also, many propositional attitudes lack an affective element.14 To 
say that someone believes it is raining is to say nothing about their feelings or emotions. On 
the other hand, if one feels contempt for another person it is usually because one has certain 
beliefs about them. One’s affective posture in this case is not a propositional attitude but is 
grounded in one’s propositional attitudes.  
Epistemic insouciance is a posture towards truth, evidence or inquiry, a posture that is 
manifested by one’s epistemic conduct. It implies, and is partly constituted by, a marked lack 
of intellectual seriousness, flippancy about basing one’s views expert opinion or what the 
evidence shows. It is a casualness or indifference to the truth and to the need to base one’s 
utterances on the relevant facts. Epistemic insouciance is not usually a matter of decision or 
choice and is in this sense involuntary. One doesn’t normally elect to be excessively casual and 
nonchalant towards the challenge of finding answers to complex questions. Epistemic 
insouciance is a reflection of what one cares about, and what one cares about is not typically a 
matter of choice or decision. It is possible not to care about what the evidence shows, or 
whether one’s views about a particular topic have any basis in reality, without having decided 
not to care about these things.    
Is epistemic insouciance an affective posture? It might seem that it is marked by the 
absence of certain feelings or emotions rather than by their presence but the reality is more 
complicated. Epistemic insouciance is not just a matter of not caring about certain things. Lack 
of concern about what the evidence shows is one element of epistemic insouciance but another 
element is contempt. There is contempt for the facts, contempt for evidence and, in the case of 
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some politicians contempt for the public. Each of these varieties of contempt is detectable in 
the epistemic posture of politicians I have described. Their contempt is the affective quality of 
their epistemic insouciance and explains their indifference to matters that ought to concern a 
conscientious truth-seeker. In addition, as I’ve noted, indifference is itself something that can 
be felt; it is not the pure absence of feeling. 
If epistemic insouciance is an attitude what is its ‘object’? Knowledge, evidence and 
inquiry are epistemic objects, and attitudes towards epistemic objects are epistemic attitudes. 
In these terms, epistemic insouciance is an epistemic attitude. Lack of concern about what the 
evidence shows is one epistemic dimension of epistemic insouciance but there are others. A 
fundamental epistemic activity for most humans is inquiry. Inquiry is the means by which we 
search for answers to our questions, ranging from the banal to the momentous. Inquiry is the 
attempt ‘to find things out, to extend our knowledge by carrying out investigations directed at 
answering questions’ (Hookway 1994: 211). Like other things we do, inquiring is something 
that can be done well or badly, and the quality of inquiry is partly a function of the attitude of 
the inquirer. To be epistemically insouciant is to have a distinctive attitude towards inquiry, to 
view the business of extending our knowledge by carrying out investigations directed at 
answering questions as a tedious chore that doesn’t merit one’s full attention. This makes 
epistemic insouciance an epistemic attitude, an attitude towards inquiry. However, the objects 
of this attitude aren’t exclusively epistemic. Contempt for the truth isn’t an epistemic attitude 
since truth isn’t an epistemic object.  
Just how representative is epistemic insouciance of attitude vices generally? Another 
attitude vice is prejudice. According to Miranda Fricker, ‘the idea of a prejudice is most 
basically that of a pre-judgement’, that is, ‘a judgement made or maintained without proper 
regard to the evidence’ (2007: 32-3). There are two ways in which this might seem at odds with 
my account of attitude vices. First, judgements are propositional attitudes rather than affective 
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postures. Second, the objects of prejudice don’t appear especially epistemic. If one has a 
negative attitude towards another person on account of their race then one is certainly guilty of 
prejudice but people and races aren’t epistemic objects, and racial prejudice doesn’t sound 
much like an epistemic attitude. These issues are brought into sharp focus by Fricker’s example 
from Harper Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird.15 In that novel, a young black man, Tom Robinson 
is accused of raping a white girl, Mayella Ewell. Tom is innocent but when the evidence of his 
innocence comes up against the all-white jury’s prejudice the latter proves decisive and he is 
found guilty. The jury doesn’t believe Tom’s account of what happened between him and 
Mayella, and this is a reflection of their attitude towards black men in general and Tom 
Robinson in particular. The jury’s prejudice is, however, not just a matter of judgement. It is 
primarily an affect-laden posture or orientation that involves deep feelings of contempt, 
loathing and superiority. The jury’s negative attitude isn’t at bottom an intellectual matter. It is 
more visceral than that. Like other affective postures one’s prejudices are partly a reflection of 
one’s judgements but this is not to say that prejudices are judgements, as Fricker suggests. 
What makes a prejudice a prejudice is that it is an attitude formed and sustained without any 
proper inquiry into the merits or demerits of its object. It is in the nature of prejudice to be 
resistant to counter-evidence but such resistance is not the exclusive preserve of judgements or 
beliefs. It can also affect affective postures.  
As for whether prejudice is an epistemic attitude, Fricker’s discussion brings out the 
sense in which it is. As she points out, in face-to-face testimonial exchanges the hearer must 
‘make some attribution of credibility regarding the speaker’ (2007: 18). If the speaker knows 
something but is disbelieved by a hearer because of the hearer’s prejudice against the speaker 
then the speaker is wronged ‘specifically in their capacity as a knower’ (2007: 1). This is one 
of the wrongs suffered by Tom Robinson, who is a victim of what Fricker calls ‘testimonial 
injustice’. Testimonial injustice is an epistemic injustice, and the prejudice that is to blame for 
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epistemic injustice is, to this extent, an epistemic attitude. Prejudice counts as an epistemic 
attitude insofar as it is an affective posture towards another person’s epistemic credentials. A 
negative attitude towards another race is not per se an epistemic attitude but it implies a 
negative epistemic attitude. If this is right then prejudice is not a counterexample to the view 
that attitude vices are epistemic postures. This is not to say, however, that all attitude vices are 
postures. As mentioned previously, some attitude vices are stances, and now would be a good 
time to flesh out the notion of a stance. My conception of a ‘stance’ is based on Bas van 
Fraassen’s account in his book The Empirical Stance, so van Fraassen’s work is the place to 
start.  
2 
According to van Fraassen, a philosophical position can consist in a ‘stance’.16 A stance 
in the literal sense is a person’s vantage point or bodily posture.17 In a less literal sense it is ‘an 
attitude adopted in relation to a particular subject’ (2004: 175). A stance in this sense is 
‘something one can adopt or reject’ (ibid.) and serves as a policy or guideline.18 It is in this 
sense that philosophical positions like empiricism are stances. For example, when empiricists 
declare that all factual knowledge must ultimately derive from experience they can be viewed 
as adopting the policy of denigrating claims to knowledge that lack any basis in experience.19 
However, stances are neither affective nor involuntary. They aren’t distinguished by the 
presence or absence of a particular affective quality and they can be voluntarily adopted or 
rejected.20 Like postures, stances may involve propositional attitudes but ‘having a stance can’t 
be equated with holding particular beliefs’ (van Fraassen 2004: 174). The policy of rejecting 
claims to knowledge claims that aren’t based on experience is based on beliefs about the 
relationship between knowledge and experience.21 Stances are usually a reflection of what one 
believes. 
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I’ve already suggested that epistemic malevolence is an attitude vice that is a stance 
rather than a posture. Jason Baehr characterises moral malevolence as ‘opposition to the good 
as such’ (2010: 190) and epistemic malevolence as ‘opposition to knowledge as such’ (2010: 
203). Being malevolent in either sense is a policy rather than a posture: it is a voluntarily 
adopted epistemic attitude that lacks an affective element.22 For Baehr, the opposition to the 
good that is essential to malevolence, whether moral or epistemic, is volitional, active and 
personally deep.23 It is volitional in the sense that it involves the will and is not the mere 
preference that the good should be opposed. It is active in the sense that it issues in actual 
attempts to ‘stop, diminish, undermine, destroy, speak out, or turn others against the good’ 
(2010: 190). Finally, what makes it personally deep is that it reflects the malevolent person’s 
cares and concerns. Assuming that the epistemic good is knowledge, epistemic malevolence is 
opposition to knowledge. In its ‘impersonal’ form it is opposition to knowledge ‘as such’. In 
contrast, ‘personal’ epistemic malevolence is opposition to another person’s share of 
knowledge or to their ‘epistemic well-being as such’ (2010: 203). 
A rich source of examples of epistemic malevolence is research in the emerging field 
of agnotology, the study of the production and maintenance of ignorance.24 One example is the 
tobacco industry’s attempts to generate and maintain public ignorance concerning tobacco’s 
impact on health. The story of this exercise in fact fighting, which is told by Naomi Oreskes & 
Erik Conway in their book Merchants of Doubt, is well worth recounting if the aim is to see 
what real world epistemic malevolence might look like.25 The story begins in the 1950s with 
the discovery that smoking causes lung cancer. The tobacco industry was thrown into panic by 
this discovery and reacted by hiring a public relations firm to challenge the scientific evidence. 
The firm recommended the creation of a Tobacco Industry Research Committee which would 
fund research to cast doubt on the link between smoking and cancer. 
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Doubt was the key. In the words of a notorious memo written by one tobacco industry 
executive, ‘Doubt is our product since it is the best means of competing with the “body of fact” 
that exists in the minds of the general public’.26 What Oreskes & Conway refer to as the 
‘tobacco strategy’ was simple but highly effective. By ‘cherry-picking data and focusing on 
unexplained or anomalous details’ (2010: 18) the aim was to manufacture uncertainty about 
the health effects of smoking and to foster the impression of a genuine scientific debate about 
the link. The industry’s view was that there was no proof that tobacco was bad. It promoted 
this view by manufacturing a debate and ‘convincing the mass media that responsible 
journalists had an obligation to represent “both sides” of it’ (2010: 16). This strategy worked, 
especially in court, where for many years the tobacco industry was able to defend itself by 
supplying expert witnesses to testify that the link between smoking and cancer was uncertain. 
The industry knew perfectly well that smoking was harmful but it ‘conspired to suppress this 
knowledge…. to fight the facts and to merchandise doubt’ (2010: 33). The merchandising of 
doubt about the effects of smoking was the means by which the industry tried to prevent the 
public from knowing what it knew. If the public doubted whether smoking was harmful, or 
thought it was still an open question, then they couldn’t know or believe that smoking was 
harmful because they wouldn’t be confident that this was the case. 
The tobacco strategy generalises and indeed similar methods have been used by climate 
change deniers, anti-vaccination campaigners and others to sow the seeds of doubt about what 
is in reality overwhelming scientific evidence.27 In every case the basic strategy is to employ 
scientists to denigrate the work of their mainstream colleagues and suggest that the facts are 
less clear than they really are. However, Oreskes & Conway suggest that the modern era of 
fighting facts began with the tobacco strategy. The story they tell is ‘about a group of scientists 
who fought the scientific evidence and spread confusion on many of the most important issues 
of our time’ (2010: 9). An obvious question is: why would any self-respecting scientist want 
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to do that? No doubt the financial incentives were considerable but it is difficult for anyone 
familiar with these notions not to think that moral and epistemic malevolence were also playing 
a significant role. The sense in which the scientists employed by the tobacco industry were 
morally malevolent is that they actively undermined the physical well-being of smokers by 
making them less likely to kick the habit. The scientists’ epistemic malevolence consisted in 
their opposition to epistemic well-being of smokers by spreading knowledge-undermining 
doubts about the health effects of smoking. They blocked the spread of knowledge by fighting 
genuine facts with ‘alternative facts’ and relying on the inability of non-scientists and the media 
to tell the difference.28 They didn’t bullshit about the dangers of smoking, they lied about its 
dangers and about what they knew. 
One worry one might have about describing the tobacco strategy as epistemically 
malevolent in Baehr’s sense is that its target is too specific. Presumably the tobacco industry 
was not opposed to knowledge as such and so didn’t display epistemic malevolence in its 
impersonal form. Nor did it oppose the overall epistemic well-being of cigarette smokers. All 
it did was to prevent many cigarette smokers from acquiring or retaining one specific variety 
of knowledge – knowledge of the health consequences of cigarette smoking – and one might 
think that this target is too narrow for talk of epistemic malevolence to be appropriate. This is 
so even if it is recognised that the tobacco strategy did a lot of collateral epistemic damage. For 
example, its assault on scientific knowledge of the effects of smoking was also implicitly an 
assault on scientific knowledge more generally. Scepticism about mainstream science in one 
domain can easily lead to scepticism in others but the tobacco strategy itself was only 
concerned to undermine the received scientific wisdom in one domain. 
One response to this worry would be to broaden the notion of epistemic malevolence 
to allow even highly targeted knowledge-undermining to count as an instance of it. Even if the 
tobacco strategy lacks the full generality of epistemic malevolence as Baehr understands it, it 
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is still recognisably a form of epistemic malevolence. A different response to the concern about 
the narrowness of the tobacco strategy would be to look for less restricted forms of epistemic 
malevolence to illustrate the phenomenon. For example, the epistemic malevolence of certain 
tabloid newspapers and news channels seems quite general. They undermine the epistemic 
well-being of their readers and viewers in more general sense by presenting propaganda as 
news and implicitly promoting the lowering of epistemic standards. It is as if these news outlets 
are actively trying to deaden or damage the epistemic sensibilities of the electorate. Prolonged 
exposure to Fox News or British tabloids can’t do anyone much good, epistemically speaking. 
What is the relationship between epistemic malevolence and epistemic insouciance? 
They are conceptually distinct though often allied in practice. The conceptual distinction is 
between not caring about something and actively opposing it. Epistemic malevolence is 
different from epistemic insouciance precisely because it is not a matter of being excessively 
casual or nonchalant about the challenge of finding answers to complex questions or tending 
to view such questions less complex than they really are. Whatever else the tobacco industry 
can be accused of it isn’t that. Unlike the epistemically insouciant, the epistemically malevolent 
don’t find the need to find evidence in support of their views a mere inconvenience. They are 
in the business of actively undermining what, in private, they recognise as good evidence in 
favour of the views they seek to undermine. It is precisely because the epistemically malevolent 
do care what the evidence shows or what the facts are that they are in the business of subverting 
the evidence or putting forward “alternative facts”. The tobacco industry cared very much what 
the evidence showed about harmful effects of smoking and a good number of industry 
executives gave up smoking when they saw the evidence. What they didn’t want was for their 
customers to do the same and that is not at all the same as not caring about the evidence.  
A very natural way to capture these intuitive distinctions is to conceptualise epistemic 
malevolence as a stance rather than a posture. Stances aren’t distinguished by the presence or 
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absence of a particular affective quality and much the same goes for epistemic malevolence. 
Epistemic malevolence is an attitude but not an affective attitude like epistemic insouciance. 
Baehr suggests at one point that malevolence involves a kind of ‘hostility or contempt for the 
good’ (2010: 190), and this might make this attitude appear no less ‘affective’ than epistemic 
insouciance. However, hostility or contempt for the epistemic good isn’t essential for epistemic 
malevolence. What motivated the tobacco strategy wasn’t contempt for knowledge but 
economic self-interest. Furthermore, the tobacco industry’s epistemic malevolence, like 
epistemic malevolence generally, was a matter of policy rather than a passive orientation, the 
policy of spreading doubts about the dangers of smoking. It was open to the industry to adopt 
or reject this policy. Epistemic malevolence is voluntary in a way that postures are not. One 
doesn’t decide not to care about whether one’s views are supported by the evidence, in the way 
that one decides whether to undermine another person’s knowledge or the evidence on which 
their knowledge is based.    
Despite the relatively clear conceptual distinction between epistemic insouciance and 
epistemic malevolence it can be hard to know which vice a person’s conduct exemplifies. It is 
reasonably clear that the tobacco strategy was epistemically and morally malevolent but what 
about the way that some Leave campaigners argued in favour of Britain’s exit from the EU? 
For example, they claimed that Britain sends £350 million a week to the EU and this amount 
would be available for the National Health Service after Britain’s exit. Yet the £350 million 
figure was misleading since it took no account of money paid to Britain by the EU, and the 
suggestion that an extra £350 million a week would be available for the National Health Service 
after Brexit was hastily withdrawn by the official Leave campaign after its victory in the 2016 
referendum.29 To describe the attitude of those responsible for this strategy as epistemically 
insouciant might be seen as over-generous. In its own way, the spreading of misleading 
information about the economic benefits of leaving the EU was as epistemically malevolent as 
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the tobacco strategy. The active promotion of political and economic ignorance was the policy 
of some senior figures in the Leave campaign, and not just a reflection of an epistemic posture. 
Yet some of these same figures also displayed what I have been calling epistemic insouciance. 
Exactly where epistemic insouciance ends and epistemic malevolence begins is sometimes hard 
to say, and the attitude of many politicians in democratic political systems is a mixture of the 
two. What, if anything, can be done about this is an important question, but not for discussion 
here. 
3 
The remaining question is: in what sense are epistemic insouciance and epistemic 
malevolence epistemic vices? For obstructivism epistemic vices systematically obstruct the 
gaining, keeping or sharing of knowledge, and different vices bear on different dimensions of 
our knowledge. Intellectual arrogance systematically obstructs the gaining and the sharing of 
knowledge. For example, as Thomas Ricks shows in his book about the Iraq war, the arrogant 
and dismissive attitude of senior members of the Bush administration prevented them from 
coming to know how many troops would be needed in Iraq after the US invasion in 2003.30 It 
did that by making it difficult for them to learn from those in the military who knew the answer 
to their question. By the same token, those who knew the answer were prevented from sharing 
their knowledge. Prejudice is another attitude that obstructs the gaining and sharing of 
knowledge. In Fricker’s example, the jury’s prejudice prevented Tom Robinson from sharing 
his knowledge and thereby also prevented it from knowing what happened to Mayella Ewell. 
With epistemic malevolence the primary impact is on the gaining and keeping of knowledge. 
For those who didn’t know about the link between smoking and cancer the aim of the tobacco 
strategy was to prevent them from coming to know about it. With regard to people already who 
knew about the link the aim was to deprive them of their knowledge. As for the epistemic 
consequences of epistemic insouciance, lack of concern about the truth makes it harder to know 
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the truth, while the casual disparaging of experts prevents them from share their knowledge 
with the rest of us. In addition, the half-truths and outright falsehoods are the natural by-product 
of epistemic insouciance make it harder for us to retain our knowledge. Being subjected to a 
relentless barrage of misleading statements about a given subject can deprive one of one’s prior 
knowledge of that subject by muddying the waters and making one mistrust one’s own 
judgement, even if one’s judgements is in fact sound.     
These impacts of attitude vices on our knowledge are made intelligible by an account 
of knowledge on which one knows that P only if P is true, one is reasonably confident that P 
and one has the right to be confident.31 On this account, which is by no means the only account 
that is capable of explaining the impact of epistemic vices on our knowledge, one way for an 
attitude vice to get in the way of knowledge is for it to make one’s beliefs less likely to be true. 
All the epistemic vices I have been describing have that effect. The evidence in favour of a 
belief is evidence for its truth, and beliefs with adequate evidential backing are much more 
likely to be true than beliefs that lack such backing. Attitude vices, like epistemic vices 
generally, get in the way of knowledge by making one’s beliefs less likely to be evidence-
based. The jury’s prejudice in To Kill a Mockingbird meant that they didn’t base their belief in 
Tom Robinson’s guilt on the evidence, and as a result ended up with the false belief that he 
was guilty. Similarly, it wasn’t just bad luck that the Bush administration’s beliefs about the 
number of US troops that would be needed in Iraq were false. They were false because they 
weren’t based on the evidence and they weren’t evidence-based because the arrogance of 
Donald Rumsfeld and others led them to ignore that evidence. Someone who is epistemically 
insouciant as well as intellectually arrogant is even less likely to end up with true beliefs: not 
caring about the evidence is hardly conducive to forming beliefs that are evidence-based.       
Another way for attitude vices to get in the way of knowledge is by undermining one’s 
confidence and making it more difficult for one to hold on to one’s true beliefs. This is the 
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essence of the tobacco strategy. The surest way to deprive someone of their knowledge of the 
connection between smoking and cancer is to instil doubts in their mind about whether there 
really is a link. The more one doubts the existence of a link the less confident one is that it is 
genuine. Beyond a certain point this loss of confidence implies loss of belief and, by 
implication, loss of knowledge. However, the person who is deprived of knowledge by the vice 
of epistemic malevolence is not the person with the vice. Epistemic malevolence is this this 
respect different from other epistemic vices, whose primary epistemic impact is on those whose 
vices they are. Epistemic malevolence is other-directed, and its effectiveness is an indication 
of the close relationship between knowledge, belief and confidence. Instilling doubts about the 
link between smoking and cancer is only effective as a means of depriving a person of 
knowledge of this link on the assumption that knowledge requires confidence. 
This point is worth making because the idea that epistemic confidence is a condition of 
knowledge is not uncontroversial.32 It has often been argued, correctly, that knowledge doesn’t 
require certainty, and some epistemologists have even questioned the idea that belief is a 
condition of knowledge.33 If knowledge doesn’t require belief then depriving someone of their 
belief that smoking causes cancer doesn’t necessarily deprive them of their knowledge that 
smoking causes cancer. If knowledge doesn’t require confidence then undermining one’s 
confidence that smoking causes cancer doesn’t necessarily deprive one of one’s knowledge of 
this fact. However, it is easy to turn this argument on their head: if confidence and belief are 
not required for knowledge then the tobacco strategy would not be nearly as effective as it is. 
The datum is that the tobacco strategy is an effective knowledge-deprivation strategy, and the 
best explanation of this datum is that without a suitable degree of confidence in one’s beliefs 
there is no knowledge.   
Just how easily an individual can be caused to lose confidence in a particular belief of 
theirs depends, no doubt, on the nature of the belief and the nature of the individual. A person 
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who is presented with good grounds for doubting whether P might continue to be confident 
that P but the question in such cases is whether their confidence is justified. This points to a 
third way for attitude vices to get in the way of knowledge: by depriving one of one’s right to 
be confident that P rather than by depriving one of one’s confidence. Imagine a variation on 
Harper Lee’s story in which Tom is guilty but where the jury’s confidence in his guilt is the 
result of prejudice rather than a sober consideration of the evidence. In that case the jury would 
have no right to be confident that Tom is guilty and wouldn’t know he is guilty, even if he is. 
It isn’t always easy to be sure on what basis someone has a particular belief but to the extent 
that a person’s belief that P is attributed to an attitude vice, or indeed any another epistemic 
vice, their right to be confident that P or to believe that P is called into question. It can happen 
that a person’s belief is evidence-based but their interpretation of the evidence is itself unduly 
influenced by one or more of their attitude vices. This is another way for attitude vices get in 
the way of knowledge: even if a particular attitude vice isn’t the basis on which a person 
believes P, it might be the basis on which they interpret their evidence as indicating P. If this 
happens, they may not have the right to be confident that P. In the same way, they may lack 
the right to be confident that P if prejudice, epistemic insouciance or some other attitude vice 
is the basis on which they reject evidence against P or interpret such evidence as misleading.  
None of this is to deny that there are circumstances in which epistemic insouciance and 
other epistemic vices abet the acquisition, transmission or retention of knowledge. The claim 
is not that epistemic vices invariably get in the way of knowledge but that this is not the normal 
case. In the actual world, epistemic vices systematically get in the way of knowledge. If 
epistemic vices didn’t systematically, that is, non-haphazardly get in the way of knowledge 
there would be no reason to call them epistemic vices.34 There would also be no reason to refer 
to them in this way if they were not blameworthy or otherwise reprehensible, that is, open to 
criticism. On one view, vices are voluntarily acquired. This makes us fully responsible and 
20 
 
potentially blameworthy for our vices, whether epistemic or moral. This view has little going 
for it. It is, of course, possible to cultivate one’s vices in the way that, according to Aristotle, 
we cultivate our virtues, but prejudice, epistemic insouciance and other epistemic vices are 
often passively absorbed rather than actively cultivated.  
A more promising basis for holding people responsible and potentially blameworthy 
for their epistemic vices is the thought that even if they didn’t acquire them voluntarily it is 
nevertheless possible for them to exercise control over them and modify them. Epistemically 
malevolent tobacco industry executives were responsible for their malevolence because they 
didn’t have to be that way. Their malevolent stance was voluntary. Character traits, attitudes 
or thinking styles over which one has control, whether one exercises it or not, are ones for 
which one is responsible. Control comes in different varieties. The control we have over our 
epistemic postures is not voluntary but evaluative or manipulative.35 There is no question of 
changing one’s posture by an act of will but change is possible by evaluating whether one’s 
attitude is properly grounded or justified. For example, concluding that one’s contempt or 
epistemic insouciance is based on false beliefs or is otherwise unwarranted is potentially a way 
of becoming less contemptuous or epistemically insouciant. Since we aren’t perfectly rational 
some of our postures are resistant to this type of evaluative control and this is the point at which 
the possibility of exercising manipulative control over our attitude and other vices is 
significant. Manipulative control is exercised by implementing self-improvement strategies of 
one sort or another. If one’s attitudes are the product of environmental factors then one effective 
way to manipulate one’s attitudes is to manipulate one’s environment.36 
There is much more to say about the issue of responsibility but the intuition that some 
of the politicians I described at the outset are responsible for their epistemic insouciance is the 
intuition that they don’t have to be that way. They can and should know better and they can 
and should change their attitude. It needs to be acknowledged, however, that attitudes that are 
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revisable in principle might not be revisable in practice because of the way that they are 
sustained by environmental factors over which one has little control.37 One such factor is social 
class. In his work José Medina gives a class analysis of epistemic vice.38 He identifies a cluster 
of epistemic attitudes that he regards as ‘the epistemic vices of the privileged’, that is to say, 
vices associated with social privilege. These corrupted attitudes include epistemic arrogance, 
epistemic laziness and closed-mindedness. Even though epistemic arrogance is not always 
present in the psychology of the powerful and privileged, ‘those in a position of power are 
certainly more at risk of developing this flaw’ (2013: 31).39 In the same way, there are entire 
aspects of life with which those in positions of privilege don’t need to be familiar. Examples 
include poverty and oppression. This ‘socially produced and carefully orchestrated lack of 
curiosity’ (2013: 31) is what Medina means by ‘epistemic laziness’. Although Medina doesn’t 
mention epistemic insouciance, it is possible to see this posture as another epistemic vice of 
the privileged. Being in positions of power and privilege can result in intellectual 
overconfidence or a cognitive superiority complex, and these flaws might find expression in 
the nonchalance which is at the heart of epistemic insouciance. Epistemic insouciance and 
bullshitting are, of course, not the exclusive preserve of the privileged but might nevertheless 
be sustained by power and privilege.  
If this has any plausibility then revising one’s corrupted attitude by manipulating or 
altering one’s environment is no easy matter. It isn’t as if one can change one’s social class or 
educational background. Depending on one’s view of the conditions for blameworthiness this 
might or might not diminish privileged individuals’ blameworthiness for their corrupted 
attitudes but, in any case, epistemic vices needn’t be strictly blameworthy.40 Blame is one thing 
and criticism is another. As Julia Driver observes, ‘we sometimes, and indeed often do, make 
critical comments about someone’s intellect without blaming them’ (2000: 132). Even if Tom’s 
Robinson’s jury could not really have done anything to change its racist attitudes and was not 
22 
 
strictly blameworthy for them it would be bizarre to suppose on this account that the attitudes 
themselves, and the individual jurors holding them, were immune to criticism. The jury’s racist 
attitudes were appalling and reprehensible whether or not they were, in some ultimate sense 
responsible them. In the same way, though maybe not to the same extent, the epistemic 
insouciance of the privileged is open to criticism and in this sense reprehensible. Just what it 
takes for an attitude to be reprehensible as distinct from blameworthy is not a question that can 
be tackled here. The important points for present purposes are that Driver’s distinction is a 
good one, that epistemic insouciance is reprehensible if not blameworthy, and that this is 
enough to make it an epistemic vice given that it gets in the way of knowledge. 
That completes the main argument of this paper. There is however one more issue that 
I would like to address before bringing the discussion to a close. The focus here has been on 
attitude vices and this contrasts with so-called ‘responsibilist’ accounts of epistemic vices and 
virtues that take these to be character traits. Obstructivism has a more eclectic conception of 
epistemic vice according to which such vices can be attitudes, character traits or even ways or 
styles of thinking. Closed-mindedness is an epistemically vicious character traits and wishful 
thinking is an epistemically vicious way of thinking. What is the relationship between attitude 
vices, character vices and thinking vices, and is it absolutely clear that epistemic insouciance 
is an attitude vice? When someone like Boris Johnson is said to be epistemically insouciant 
this can be interpreted as a comment about his character or about his attitude. However, there 
is this asymmetry between the two readings: it makes no sense to suppose that a person’s 
character traits include epistemic insouciance without also supposing that they have an 
epistemically insouciant attitude to the task of finding answers to complex questions. This is a 
reflection of the fact that one’s character traits are a function of one’s attitudes in a way that 
one’s attitudes are not a function of one’s character traits.41 It makes perfect sense to suppose 
that a person might display a particular attitude in response to a particular question even if they 
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lack the corresponding character trait; their attitude in this case might be ‘out of character’. 
What it is for a person’s attitude in a given case to be epistemically insouciant can be explained 
without reference to epistemic insouciance as a character trait but the character trait can’t be 
explained without reference to the attitude. 
The relationship between attitudes and ways of thinking is less clear but there is a case 
for saying that epistemic postures are partly a reflection or function of how one thinks. A person 
with an epistemically insouciant attitude must be disposed to think in characteristic ways. 
Attitudes aren’t just ways of thinking but they involve thinking, or being disposed to think, in 
particular ways. At the same time these ways of thinking can’t be properly explained or 
understood without reference to the attitudes they manifest. If this is so then neither the attitude 
nor the way of thinking is more basic than the other though both are more basic than the 
character traits to which they correspond. It has to be said, though, that while questions about 
the basicness or explanatory priority of one kind of vice over another might be of considerable 
philosophical interest their practical interest is limited. For present purposes the important point 
isn’t that attitude vices are more or less basic than character or thinking vices but that attitude 
vices exist as a distinctive type of epistemic vice. This point seems obvious enough once it is 
made, and the neglect of attitudes in philosophical accounts of epistemic vice is difficult to 
understand.42  
It shouldn’t be in the least bit surprising that there are attitudes that are conducive to 
the gaining, sharing and keeping of knowledge and attitudes that have the opposite effect. The 
challenge in thinking about these issues from a philosophical standpoint is not to assume that 
these attitudes are ‘propositional attitudes’. Attitude vices are ‘attitudes’ in a much more 
ordinary sense, the sense in which contempt and indifference are attitudes but belief is not. It 
is the affective dimension of ordinary attitudes that I have emphasised because it is easily 
missed. More generally, it’s worth keeping in mind the importance of posture in one’s 
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intellectual or cognitive life, as in one’s physical life. The importance of one’s physical posture 
in doing physical work is widely recognised. The importance of one’s epistemic posture in 
doing epistemic work is not. Poor physical posture causes all manner of physical problems, 
and a poor epistemic posture causes all manner of intellectual problems. So the best advice to 
the epistemically insouciant and intellectually arrogant is this: improve your posture. 43      
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1  A full transcript of the interview is available here: https://corporate.sky.com/media-
centre/media-packs/2016/eu-in-or-out-faisal-islam-interview-with-michael-gove,-30616-8pm. 
2 As reported by The Independent: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/brexit-
news-donald-trump-leave-eu-campaign-facts-dont-work-arron-banks-lies-referendum-
a7111001.html 
3 Both articles appear as appendices in Shipman 2017. Shipman questions the view that Johnson 
was ‘a dedicated supporter of EU membership who decided to back Leave for the simple and 
cynical motive of advancing his career’ (2017: 171).  
4 Frankfurt 2005: 61. 
5 ‘Epistemic posture’ is from Jackson 2015. 
6 Baehr 201. 
7 Oreskes & Conway 2010. 
8 This characterisation of ‘vice epistemology’ is from Cassam 2016. 
9 This is roughly how psychologists conceive of attitudes. In psychology, ‘most attitude 
theorists would argue that evaluation is the predominant aspect of the attitude concept. In other 
words, reporting an attitude involves making a decision of liking versus disliking, or favouring 
versus disfavouring a particular issue, object, or person’ (Maio & Haddock 2015).  
10 Maio & Haddock 2015: 4. 
11 In Mason’s words, ‘in taking up contempt as a form of regard I mean to justify – ultimately 
morally justify – a certain affective stance toward another person, not (or not merely) the 
adoption of a certain belief about them (e.g., that they are contemptible)’ (2003: 239). 
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12 Is it plausible that intellectual arrogance has an affective quality? Is there really such a thing 
as a ‘feeling of superiority’ and is it essential to intellectual arrogance? On the first of these 
issues, there is no more reason to doubt the possibility of a person feeling superior than to doubt 
the possibility of their feeling smug or confident. It could be that these are all metaphorical 
uses of ‘feeling’ but there is no reason not to take appearances at face value and think of 
superiority, like smugness and confidence, as something that can be felt. To suppose that this 
feeling is not essential to arrogance is to suppose that arrogance can be totally unemotional but 
I contend that arrogance with no emotional charge is not genuine arrogance. Paradoxically, 
intellectual arrogance is not a purely intellectual attitude, and this is the key to understanding 
its behavioural manifestations. All too familiar behavioural manifestations of intellectual 
arrogance include refusing to listen or queue-jumping in discussion. The affective quality of 
arrogance that motivates these behaviours is a feeling of superiority. It is as hard to conceive 
of affectless arrogance as it is to conceive of affectless contempt. Tanesini 2016 is an 
illuminating discussion of intellectual arrogance. 
13 Think of the futility of someone who is going through a crisis of intellectual self-confidence 
deciding to feel intellectually superior. 
14 The contrast between attitudes and beliefs was one that Wittgenstein was drawing on when 
he famously wrote that one’s attitude towards another person is ‘an attitude towards a soul’ and 
that one is not ‘of the opinion that he has a soul’.  
15 Fricker 2007: 23-29. 
16 ‘A philosophical position can consist in a stance (attitude, commitment, approach, a cluster 
of such possibly including some propositional attitudes such as beliefs as well). Such a stance 
can of course be expressed, and may involve or presuppose some beliefs as well, but cannot 
simply be equated with having beliefs or making assertions about what there is’ (van Fraassen 
2002: 47). 
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17 See van Fraassen 2004: 174.  
18 For the idea that stances are best interpreted as policies or guidelines see Lipton 2004: 148 
and Teller 2004: 161. 
19 Cf. Lipton 2004: 148: ‘For example, the empirical stance includes a policy of advocating 
scientific practices and denigrating metaphysical claims. Instead of embracing a doctrine, the 
empiricist is advised to adopt such a policy’.  
20 This is the basis on which Lipton correctly interprets van Fraassen as proposing a form of 
‘epistemological voluntarism’ (2004: 147). 
21 This is at least one sense in which, as van Fraassen puts it, ‘having or adopting a stance 
consists in having or adopting a cluster of attitudes, including a number of propositional 
attitudes, which will generally include some beliefs’ (2004: 175). 
22 This is my view of epistemic malevolence rather than Baehr’s. 
23 Baehr 2010: 190. 
24 On ‘agnotology’ and the coining of this term see Proctor 2008. 
25 Oreskes & Conway 2010. 
26 Quoted in Oreskes & Conway 2010: 34. 
27 See the essays in Proctor & Schiebinger 2008. 
28 See the Wikipedia entry on ‘alternative facts’ for an account of the origins of this notion: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alternative_facts. 
29 The story of the Brexit debacle is told in Shipman 2017 and Ball 2017, chapter 1. Ball sees 
the successful Brexit campaign as the triumph of bullshit but much of what he describes is 
epistemically malevolent rather than mere bullshit. In keeping with what I have been arguing, 
and with Frankfurt’s account, Ball sees bullshit as involving a ‘casual attitude to truth’ (2017: 
13).    
30 Ricks 2007. 
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31 A. J. Ayer insists that in order to know that P one must be completely sure that P and have 
the ‘right to be sure’ (1956: 31). This is too strong. One can know that P without being sure 
that P, but not without being reasonably confident that P. See Williamson 2000: 97. 
32 Timothy Williamson objects that ‘modest people know many things without being especially 
confident of them’ (2009: 297). He accepts, however, that in order to know that P one must be 
‘reasonably confident’ that P (2000: 97). As Fricker points out, ‘many conceptions of 
knowledge cast some sort of confidence condition as a condition of knowledge’ (2007: 49). 
Mine is one such conception. 
33 Radford 1966. 
34 Compare Driver 2001: 82: ‘a virtue is a character trait that produces more good (in the actual 
world) than not systematically’’. 
35 On the notion of voluntary control see Adams 1985: 8. The distinction between ‘evaluative’ 
and ‘manipulative’ control (which she also calls ‘managerial control’) is due to Pamela 
Hieronymi. On her account, we have evaluative control over our beliefs: we control them ‘by 
evaluating what is true’ (2006: 53). We have manipulative control ‘when we manipulate some 
ordinary object to accord with our thoughts about it’ (ibid.). For example, I have manipulative 
control over the layout of the furniture in my study: I can change the layout by shifting things 
around. 
36 See Dasgupta & Greenwald 2001 and Holroyd & Kelly 2016. 
37 See Battaly 2016. 
38 For Medina, epistemic vices ‘are composed of attitudinal structures that permeate one’s entire 
cognitive life: they involve attitudes towards oneself and others in testimonial exchanges, 
attitudes towards the evidence available and one’s assessment of it, and so on’ (2013: 31). A 
key question for Medina is: ‘what are the epistemic vices that the better off of society can (or 
even tend to) develop?’ (2013: 30). 
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39 Why should that be? Because the privilege of always being presumed to know ‘sometimes 
spoils people’ (2013: 30). 
40 As Heather Battaly argue, ‘it seems possible for us to have virtues and vices for whose 
possession we are neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy’ (2016: 106). 
41 For Medina character traits are composed of attitudes, and an epistemic vice is ‘a set of 
corrupted attitudes and dispositions that get in the way of knowledge’ (2013: 30). 
42 One person who isn’t guilty of neglecting attitudes in her work on epistemic virtues and vices 
is Alessandra Tanesini. See, for example, Tanesini 2016. 
43 My work on this paper was supported by a Leadership Fellowship awarded by the UK’s Arts 
and Humanities Research Council (AHRC). I thank the AHRC for its generous support. 
